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POLITICAL FREEDOM. By Alexander Meiklejohn. New York: Harper &
Brothers. 1960. Pp. xxv, 166. $3.50.
Mr. Meik.lejohn's book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, appeared in 1948. His latest volume incorporates the 1948 text as
Part I and includes in addition under Part II, entitled "The Freedom of
the Electorate," a new chapter on the limitations of congressional authority,
the transcript of testimony given by him before the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights on "The Meaning of the First Amendment," the
text of several previously published articles dealing with the freedom of
scholars and teachers, a letter to the Harvard Crimson and a petition addressed to him by Congress, both dealing with legislative investigation of
political beliefs and associations.
The earlier treatment of free speech in its relation to self-government
is the most substantial part of the new book, for in it the author states his
basic conceptions of the function of free speech in a self-governing society.
Those who did not read the earlier volume should welcome this further
opportunity to become acquainted with what some have described as a
classic treatment of the subject. This is not to belittle the significance of
the materials found in Part II, with its discussion of academic freedom
and integrity, prompted by the actions of some universities in requiring
professors to take oaths relating to political beliefs, and of the critical
issues raised by congressional investigations into political affiliations. These
discussions reveal the same stimulating qualities of style and thought that
distinguish the earlier chapters on free speech. The basic premises, however, for the treatment of these questions are established in Part I.
It should be observed at the outset that Mr. Meik.lejohn is a master of
clear, direct and persuasive prose. The fine quality of his writing reflects
the clarity of thinking and incisiveness of analysis that impart such a convincing quality to his arguments. In tum, his reasoning stems from premises based on solid and mature thought. Here we have intellectual and
moral integrity of a high order, and any reader can understand why the
author's former students, like Professor Malcolm Sharp, who wrote the very
interesting Foreword, should speak with respect and affection for a teacher
whose clear thinking and high sense of values must have been a stimulating
classroom force.
The basic premise upon which Mr. Meik.lejohn proceeds is that the
people of the United States are their own rulers, that by means of the
Constitution they have entered into a compact whereby they retain their
position as rulers in a self-governing society, that freedom of discussion is
a means of arriving at informed judgment on matters of public concern,
and that in view of the centrality of free speech in the discussion and decision-making process, this freedom may not be limited except under very
narrowly prescribed circumstances when speech becomes irrelevant or is
identified with overt criminal conduct. In short, he argues that the First
Amendment when it says that Congress shall make no law abridging
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freedom of speech means just that. The position he takes, at least so far as
it pertains to speech in the area of public affairs, is essentially the same
position as that taken by Justice Brandeis in his famous concurring opinion
in the Whitney case,1 by Justices Black and Douglas of the present-day
Court, 2 and also at times expressed by Justice Holmes,3 although Mr.
Meiklejohn feels that Justice Holmes, in formulating the clear-and-presentdanger test in the Schenck case,4 laid the foundations for an interpretation
of the First Amendment which has done much to impair its vitality.
In developing his thesis, Mr. Meiklejohn, as part of his first chapter,
presents the picture of the New England town meeting where each interested citizen has not only his own voice to speak in respect to the subject
but joins with others in a process of mutual hearing and discussion, or what
Meiklejohn calls the process of sharing the truth, to the end that a decision
based on an awareness of all the relevant considerations may be made.
Free speech thus serves an indispensable political function. In the town
meeting no one's views may be denied because he may be expressing unpopular opinions. It is only when the roof caves in on the town meeting_
that speech becomes futile and it is only then that the moderator may call
the meeting off. For Mr. Meiklejohn the town meeting puts in miniature
the whole process of public discussion and truth-sharing which gives meaning to free speech on the national level.
In asserting that the First Amendment should be literally construed to
deny to Congress any power to abridge the freedom which the people have
retained as the rulers in our system of self-government, Mr. Meiklejohn
comes close to what may be described as an absolutist interpretation of the
First Amendment. Discussion that falls short of incitement to an overt
criminal act cannot be limited. The following passage is taken from his
book at page 123:
"An incitement, I take it, i's an utterance so related to a specific
overt act that it may be regarded and treated as a part of the doing of
the act itself, if the act is done. Its control, therefore, falls within the
jurisdiction of the legislature. An advocacy, on the other hand, even up
to the limit of arguing and planning for the violent overthrow of the
existing form of government, is one of those opinion-forming, judgment-making expressions which free men need to utter and to hear as
citizens responsible for the governing of the nation. If men are not free
to ask and to answer the question, 'Shall the present form of our government be maintained or changed?'; if, when that question is asked,
the two sides of the issue are not equally open for consideration, for
advocacy, and for adoption, then it is impossible to speak of our government as established by the free choice of a self-governing people."
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
See their dissenting opinions in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8 See his dissenting opinions in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
4Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
1
2
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The interpretation of the First Amendment, epitomized by the foregoing passage, explains why Mr. Meiklejohn objects to the "clear-andpresent-danger" test as a means of determining the validity of legislative
restrictions on free speech. He argues the the later use of this formula in
cases dealing with free speech issues has had a disastrous effect upon our
understanding of self-government and has led to annulment rather than
interpretation of the First Amendment. Under this formula the expression
of a minority opinion may be denied the protection of the First Amendment
whenever it involves clear and present danger to the public safety. Mr.
Meiklejohn characterizes the clear-and-present-danger language as "a peculiarly inept and unsuccessful attempt to formulate an exception to the
principle of the freedom of speech." (p. 45)
Since Justice Holmes was associated with this test and first enunciated
it in the Schenck case, Mr. Meiklejohn takes occasion to examine the
Holmesian philosophy in respect to law and the social order. Holmes,
according to the author, was an individualist and this view colored all his
thinking. Pointing out that Holmes did not attach much meaning to the
idea of the dignity of man, did not share the view of our political society
as a self-governing community seeking to achieve common ends in the
pursuit of the general welfare, but instead looked upon government and
law as a means of reconciling and accommodating competing private interests, and was more likely to think of the "bad man" as an influential factor
in the shaping of law, the author concludes that Holmes did not fully
appreciate the place of good men in the community and their concern for
the common welfare rising above selfish group and private interests and
that for this reason did not fully appreciate the meaning of free speech as
a means to truth-sharing in the pursuit of the common good of the politically-organized community.
Moreover, Meiklejohn . feels that Holmes, in formulating clear and
present danger in his interpretation of the First Amendment, confused two
basically different ideas-freedom of public speech under the First Amendment, which cannot be abridged, and the liberty of private speech which is
protected under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. This
distinction between the unabridgeable freedom of the people to arrive at
decisions on public policy questions by the process of mutual discussion
and the qualified liberty under the due process clause to speak on matters
of private interest is fundamental to Meiklejohn's thesis and must be fully
understood in order to appreciate his interpretation of the First Amendment. Legislation restrictive of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment is valid when measured by the standard of reasonableness. Whenever
citizens are using speech to advance their own interests, they are asserting
at most a liberty that may reasonably be curtailed. This obviously affords
wide range for judicial interpretation and weighing of interests. Thus libel
and slander laws fit into this category. But this liberty should not be con-
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fused with the First Amendment's "freedom" to speak on matters of public
concern. This sharp distinction makes clear that Mr. Meiklejohn rejects
the idea that the function of government is simply to reconcile and accommodate conflicting private interests. This is a part of it, as he admits, but its
more important function is to develop in a positive way the policies that
promote the great purposes for which the people joined together in choosing
and ordaining this governm~nt. It is because of his emphasis on free speech
in the determination of public policy that Mr. Meiklejohn entitled his new
volume "Political Freedom" and that in the first section of the new Part
II he emphasizes the importance of the electoral process in the system of
self-government. His emphasis then is on free speech as the central ingredient of political freedom.
As this reviewer pointed out above, Mr. Meiklejohn writes and argues
persuasively. No reader can fail to be impressed by the intellectual force
and moral earnestness of its arguments. He makes out a convincing case for
the priority of free speech in a democratic society, and his whole treatment
tends to give support to the Supreme Court's declarations in recent years
that the First Amendment's freedoms are preferred freedoms just because
they are the lifeblood of a democratic society.15 In the presentation of this
point Mr. Meiklejohn has rendered a notable service, and the book deserves
wide reading by all citizens to recall for them the first principles with
respect to our government.
One may share many of the writer's conclusions without accepting all
of his premises. Mr. Meiklejohn, in advancing his thesis, does not rest his
case on natural right or even on abstract considerations relating to the
function of free speech in a democratic society. Instead, he develops the
compact theory of our Constitution, as resting on the consent of the governed and on the retention by the people of the power to make their own
decisions including, necessarily, the freedom to speak, the freedom to hear,
and the freedom to share truth, all indispensable to the making of these
decisions. To some it may appear that characterization of the politically
organized society in terms of a compact stretches the concept of contract
beyond meaningful significance.
The most vulnerable part in Mr. Meiklejohn's thesis, however (at least
it would so appear to lawyers), is the sharp distinction he makes between
speech on matters of public interest and speech in assertion of private
interest. When the author states that the first type pf speech is protected by
the First Amendment and the latter by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, he is weaving whole cloth so far as legal doctrine is concerned.
Certainly the Supreme Court has recognized no such distinction, except
insofar as some members of the court have distinguished between freedom
of the First Amendment as a restriction on Congress and the same freedoms
treated as part of the fundamental liberties protected under the due process
5

See McKay, "The Preference for Freedom,'' 34 N.Y.

UNIV.

L. REv. 1182 (1959).
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The attempt to classify by reference
to these distinctions creates difficulties that Mr. Meiklejohn does not attempt
to resolve, although he does suggest that it would be appropriate to bring
within the private interest category the speech activities by "lobbyists for
special interests, by advertisers in press or radio, by picketing labor unions,
by Jehovah's Witnesses, by the distributors of hand bills on city streets, by
preachers of racial intolerance, and many others." (p. 83)
The suggestion that persons preaching race hatred are serving private
interests and cannot claim the protection of due process illustrates the difficulty of classification. To be sure, the majority in the Beauharnais case7
characterized the Illinois anti-hate statute as an extension of libel, and
probably Mr. Meiklejohn would concur in this result. Yet Justices Black
and Douglas dissented because they viewed this actually as an exercise of
the right to petition since the defendants were trying to influence local
governmental policy. Or consider the validity of legislation directed against
obscene literature. In the Roth and Alberts cases,8 the Court answered
the First Amendment argument by saying that obscenity did not come
within the free speech guarantee. Mr. Meiklejohn (in the event he agreed
with this result, and the reviewer is not so sure he would) would have to say
that the First Amendment was irrelevant since the distributors of these
books were engaged in a business enterprise for their own profit and were
thereby advancing their own interest, and that at most, therefore, they
could claim a restricted liberty under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Yet dissenters in these cases objected that the First Amendment was designed to protect against the kind of thought control they found
present in the statutes. To mention cases like these is to suggest the problem of classification if we are to follow Mr. Meiklejohn's categories.
Moreover, as he recognizes, the real importance of free speech under the
First Amendment is not to be defined so much in terms of the right of the
speaker but rather in terms of the right of a community to hear and to make
a decision after all views have become known. If this is so, then certainly
6 See Justice Jackson's dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 at 288 (1952),
and Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 500-508
(1957).
So far as the Fourteenth Amendment and the restrictions on state power are concerned, the author (pp. 52-54) suggests the argument that the privileges and immunities
clause should be employed to protect freedom of political speech against abridgment by
the states, to parallel the First Amendment restriction on Congress, and that the due
process clause should be used to protect private speech against unreasonable restriction
by the states. However, since the Supreme Court in application of the fundamental rights
interpretation has said that the First Amendment freedoms are incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment via the due process clause, the application of Mr. Meiklejohn's
theory which distinguishes between speech on matters of public concern and speech in
promotion of private interests leads to the result that two basically different kinds of speech
are recoguized as part of the "liberty" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
s Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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many forms of speech based on the assertion of private interest become
matters of public concern insofar as they become the basis of political
decisions. Lobbying and dissemination of propaganda by private interests
surely play a part in the shaping of legislative policy on important public
questions. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the Communist Party in
advocating overthrow of government in order to advance its own power is
asserting a selfish interest which, however, is rescued from the lower liberties secured by the due process clause because it is relevant to the people's final
decision on the question whether they want a change of government. In any
event it is difficult to see why the Communist Party's advocacy of violent
overthrow of government stands on a higher level than a labor union's
advocacy of repeal by the usual legislative process of the Taft-Hartley Act
or a natural gas company's advocacy of repeal of federal legislation providing for federal control of the price charge by a producer of natural gas.
Notwithstanding the difficulties, there is a practical merit in Mr. Meiklejohn's position which appears to be recognized by the Supreme Court decisions as evidenced by the Beauharnais and Roth cases, neither of which
spoke in terms of clear and present danger, and which rested on the exercise of the police power to protect appropriate public interests. On the
other hand, the decisions in the cases dealing with internal security legis-•
lation,9 whatever one may say about the outcome of these decisions, do
indicate that the Court regards speech when related to freedom of political
action as rising to a higher level.
This leaves for discussion Mr. Meiklejohn's criticism of the clear-andpresent-danger test, which he regards as inimical to the freedom that the
First Amendment requires in respect to speech as a concomitant of political
freedom. The use of this test may be criticized quite apart from the basic
considerations advanced by Meiklejohn against it. It is an illusion to treat
the phrase as a test. Even before its dilution in the Dennis case,1° it did
not convey the precise and certain meaning that we may expect of any socalled "test." And certainly the substitution of "clear and probable danger"
in the Dennis case further impaired the significance of this language. Moreover, the attempt to make it a universal standard in all cases dealing with
the various facets of freedom of expression was bound to fail. The words
do, however, have value as symbolizing the high and unique place of free
speech in our society. Also, the weighing and the balancing-of-interest
process which is implicit in the clear-and-present-danger formula does point
to the function that the Court has assumed in deciding First Amendment
issues. It is here, of course, that Mr. Meiklejohn objects. According to him,
there is nothing to weigh against free speech in the discussion of public
affairs. Free speech may be limited only when there is no longer opportunity for discussion because the nature of the emergency has made recourse
9 See American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
lODennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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to rational argument meaningless, and it may be punished only when it
operates as an incitement to overt criminal conduct. An advocacy of action,
even of violent action, not amounting to an· incitement to overt criminal
conduct, cannot be punished since the people should have an opportunity
to pass upon the issues presented by such advocacy. At this point, it appears
to the reviewer that Mr. Meiklejohn deviates from the compact theory on
which he lays so much stress. The Constitution, which he declares is the
basic agreement for self-government to which we are all a party, includes
as one of the terms of the contract provisions for amendment and change
to be achieved in an orderly and peaceful way. That the people have a right
to decide whether to change the government by peaceful means consistent
with the terms of the contract is clear. Advocacy of change by violence is
not, however, within the terms of the compact. It appears to be a non
sequitur that those advocating change by violence must be heard in order
that the people may make a decision on whether to change their government.
Since the Supreme Court has not allocated the several facets of free
speech to the First and Fifth Amendments, respectively, depending on
whether the speech is identified with political freedom or with the assertion
of private interest, as advocated by Mr. Meiklejohn, it is fair to predict that
the Court will continue to use the pragmatic process of resolving First
Amendment questions by balancing the various interests at stake in the
cases that come before it. Indeed, this pragmatic method is characteristic
of the whole process of constitutional adjudication as it has developed in
recent years. Nor is this process necessarily as inimical to freedom as one
might gather from Mr. Meiklejohn's criticism. In asserting that the liberty
to speak in support of private interest stands on a lower level and in recognizing that even speech in relation to matters of public concern may be
limited when it operates as incitement to overt conduct, Mr. Meiklejohn
also engages in the balancing process and is telling us what is important in
determining where the lines are to be drawn. Free speech must be subordinated t'o the interest of the public in preventing and punishing criminal
conduct. Mr. Meiklejohn reaches his result by saying that speech closely
related to certain criminal conduct is outside the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, reaches its result by saying that in this
case the public interest in safety and security outweighs the interest of free
speech. Mr. Meiklejohn draws the line at the point where speech is identified with overt conduct. The Supreme Court draws it at a point where
speech is identified with advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action.11
Whether the Supreme Court in applying its balancing process should draw
the line at the same point that Mr. Meiklejohn does is a matter of judgment. When Mr. Meiklejohn says that the First Amendment protects
advocacy of conduct that stops short of incitement but does not protect
11

See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 at 318 (1957).
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advocacy that actually incites to overt conduct, this too is a matter of judgment.
The point is that the interpretation of the First Amendment in the
context of a concrete case requires judgment in the identification and
appraisal of the competing interests at stake, regardless of whether the
Court approaches its task by a definitional process whereby it labels a certain type of speech as either protected or non-protected under the First
Amendment or by a process that weighs the kind of speech involved as
against the kind of competing public interest protected by the restrictive
legislation. There is nothing inherent in the balancing technique or even
in the test of reasonableness that precludes the Court from saying, in line
with Mr. Meiklejohn's thesis, that restriction on political speech activities
may not be permitted unless the speech is identified with unlawful action.
The merit of the balancing technique is that it warrants consideration of
all the relevant factors. At this point it may be observed that Mr. Meiklejohn's thesis apparently disregards the whole concept of conspiracy to advance unlawful ends-a concept well recognized in the law and which led
Justice Jackson to say in the Dennis case that the clear-and-present-danger
test and the assumptions underlying it were irrelevant in view of the problem presented there. Surely the conspiracy factor must be taken into account
in any appraisal of the total situation. Mention may also be made of the
problem presented when the imposition of civil disabilities results in indirect abridgment of First Amendment freedoms, as in the cases where persons
are made ineligible for continued public employment i£ they take part in
political activities or fail to disclaim membership in organizations advocating overthrow of the government by force, or where officers of labor
unions must sign non-Communist affidavits as a condition of the unions'
continued enjoyment of the privileges granted by the National Labor Relations Act. Here again the Court has employed the balancing process and
weighed competing interests in arriving at its results.12 It is not clear
whether in Mr. Meiklejohn's analysis these cases should be treated the same
as direct abridgments of the kind of free speech he finds protected under the
First Amendment or whether he would resolve them by reference to the
due process analysis.1a
12 See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (prohibition
on political activities by federal employees under the Hatch Act); Garner v. Board of
Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (oath required of municipal employees);
American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (non-Communist
affidavit required of labor union officers under the Taft-Hartley Act).
13 Mr. Meiklejohn does make clear that in his opinion a person called before a legislative investigating committee should not be compelled under pain of criminal prosecution to answer questions relating to his political beliefs and affiliations. (pp. 148-164)
The First and Fifth Amendments taken together should be construed to give an absolute
right to refuse disclosures of this kind. The Supreme Court in applying the balancing
process upheld the right of non-disclosure in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
but rejected the claim in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), and Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). Likewise, the Court has sustained a state's power to compel
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It is important that the Court, in applying the balancing technique,
adequately identify the various public and private interests which are involved and their relative importance.14 Otherwise the balancing process
can easily become a method for rationalizing the dilution of important
freedoms. Certainly the function of free speech as a truth-sharing medium
to enable a wise decision by the community on matters of public concern
gives it the highest priority in the identification and evaluation of interests.
Secondly, it is important that the Court, operating within the framework
of the identifiable and competing interests at stake, make its own determination on the basis of the record before it to see whether the speech activities
in issue were privileged under the First Amendment. It appears to this reviewer that the Court's greatest contribution with respect to free speech is
not found in its determinations respecting the constitutionality of statutes
but rather in its review of the concrete cases that come before it where
speech restrictions are involved. The decision in the Dennis case1 " was
unsatisfactory since the Court limited itself to an adjudication of the constitutionality of the statute. More meaningful in a good many ways was
the later opinion in the Yates case1 6 where the Court looked at the record
to determine whether or not there was evidence that would warrant a jury's
finding that the defendants had conspired to advocate overthrow of the
government. As one goes back over the earlier cases also,1 7 including the
Abrams case where Justice Holmes wrote his eloquent dissent, it is clear that
Justices Holmes and Brandeis in dissent were less concerned with the abstract
question of the constitutionality of the statute than they were with the
validity of its concrete application by reference to what the defendants had
said and any possible public danger that may have grown out of it.
One final point may be made here with respect to Mr. Meiklejohn's
book. He accepts implicitly the Supreme Court's position as final interpreter of the Constitution, and rightly attributes a good deal of influence
to the Court in the shaping of basic ideas in our constitutional tradition.
The question may be raised, however, whether or not Mr. Meiklejohn overestimates the total role of the Supreme Court. One may, for instance, question his statement that the decline in importance of free speech in the past
forty years is attributable largely to the Supreme Court. (pp. 79, 106) In
the end, the importance of free speech in our society and the sense of concern about its full protection must rest on the understanding of the people.
disclosure of affiliation as a condition of continued public employment. See Lerner v.
Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), and Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
14 See Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
at 141-145 (1959), where he criticizes the majority opinion for what he regarded as its
mistake in determining the proper factors to be weighed. Also see McKay, "The Preference
for Freedom,'' 34 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1182 at 1193-1203 (1959).
15 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
16 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
17 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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Congress and the executive must also share this concern. The Supreme
Court can lead, and undoubtedly it exercises a teaching function, but as our
history has demonstrated, the Supreme Court will over the long run be
responsive to and reflect preponderant public sentiments and opinion. The
greater need, therefore, as Mr. Meiklejohn also recognizes, is to educate
the citizens in respect to the function of free spech in our society and to
create that sense of public responsibility essential to the buttressing and
defense of this freedom. Mr. Meiklejohn's superb and illuminating treatment is a notable contribution to the subject and is precisely the kind of
book that will promote public understanding and appreciation of free
speech at its highest level. It deserves a wide reading.

Paul G. Kauper,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

